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HIS Survey is intended for use by the average banking law practi-
tioner in Texas. As the Survey reflects, it is designed to update the
practitioner over the wide variety of matters that the banking
practitioner faces. As such, some overlap with the Secured Transaction,
Real Estate and Bankruptcy Surveys is inevitable.
II. CASE LAW
A. BRANCH BANKING
This year, the Texas Banking Commissioner fought two interstate
branch banking cases. The first, Ghiglieri v. Ludwig,1 involved an Arkan-
sas domiciled bank that sought to open its main office in Texas and main-
tain its former locations in Arkansas as branches. The second case,
Ghiglieri v. Sun World, N.A.,2 involved a Texas bank that sought to move
its headquarters to New Mexico and maintain its Texas locations as
branches of the New Mexico bank. In both cases, the moves were ap-
proved by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), each
bank's primary regulator, and opposed by the Texas Banking Commis-
sion as violations of the prohibition in Texas against interstate branch
banking.
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiencies Act of
1994 (Riegle-Neal) authorizes interstate branch banking by merger or ac-
quisition of a bank unless a state has opted out of this statutory scheme. 3
In May of 1995, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 8894 "opting
out" of the benefits introduced by the Riegle-Neal Act. Thus, while the
action of the Arkansas bank could have been authorized under the
Riegle-Neal Act, had Texas elected to permit early interstate merger, 5
having opted out of the Riegle-Neal Act altogether, the Comptroller had
to find other justification to allow the interstate expansion.
In the Ludwig case, the Comptroller's Office authorized the relocation
of the Arkansas bank's main office to Texas, and the retention of its prior
offices as branches, pursuant to the relocation authority applicable to na-
tional banks. The relocation authority allows a national bank, upon writ-
ten notice to the Comptroller, to change the location of its main office to
any other location within or outside the limits of its home city, but no
more than thirty miles beyond the city limits.6 However, as the court
pointed out, the provisions dealing with relocation contain no express au-
1. Civ. No. 3:95-CV-2001-H, 1996 WL 315947 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 1996).
2. 942 F. Supp. 1111 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
3. Pub. L. No. 103-328, § 102a, 108 Stat. 2338, 2352-54 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C.§§ 30(c), 36(e)(2) (1995)).
4. Act of Apr. 19, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 58, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 437
(Vernon) (codified at TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 489(f) (Vernon Supp. 1997)).
5. Pursuant to § 102(a)(3)(A) of the Riegle-Neal Act.
6. 12 U.S.C. § 36(e) (1995).
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thority to allow a national bank to retain its prior branches, and the court
concluded that to allow a relocating bank to do so, where one of the loca-
tions was in a state that did not permit interstate branch banking, would
be a violation of the McFadden Act. 7 Since the McFadden Act only per-
mits branches within the municipality of a bank's main branch and only in
those states that permit branch banking, there was no support under fed-
eral law for the transaction and the court overruled the Comptroller's
consent to it.8
In Sun World, the Texas Banking Commissioner again asserted that
there was no provision of federal law that would allow a Texas bank to
relocate its main office to another state and retain its prior locations as
branches. Again, the controlling statute is the McFadden Act.9 Here,
since neither New Mexico law nor Texas law allows a New Mexico bank
to branch back into Texas, no provision of federal law permits it either.
These cases illustrate the ongoing conflict, both in Texas and elsewhere,
between state bank chartering agencies, intent on fostering a healthy
state banking system, and the OCC, which is intent on establishing a cen-
tralized, multi-regional concentration of banks and bank capital.
B. USURY
1. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.
During this Survey period the United States Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. 10 This case has wide-
ranging implications on the debate whether a state or national bank char-
ter is better. It will also have a major impact on state efforts to provide
consumer protection. Ms. Smiley, a resident of California, held a credit
card issued by Citibank's South Dakota affiliate. She alleged that the late
payment fees charged by the bank, although legal under South Dakota
law, violated California law. In an interesting application of logic, Justice
Scalia notes that where the provisions of the National Banking Act are
ambiguous, such as whether or not a late charge is considered interest,
the Court should defer to the reasonable judgment of the Comptroller,
the official charged with administering national banks.11 Then the Court
turns to a regulation issued by the Comptroller of the Currency which
includes within the definition of interest, late payment fees.12 However,
this regulation was promulgated during the pendency of Smiley's appeal
of a California Superior Court's dismissal of her complaint against Ci-
tibank. However, because the Court finds the Comptroller's regulation a
rational extension of the definition of interest contained in the National
Banking Act, it allows the Comptroller's regulation to act as a deux ex
7. Ludwig, 1996 WL 315947, at *6-8; McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C.§ 36 (1995).
8. Ludwig, 1996 WL 315947, at *11.
9. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1995).
10. 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
11. Id. at 1733-34.
12. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a) (1996).
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machina to extract Citibank from the possibility that its late fees would
violate the Consumer Protection Laws of California.' 3
2. Alamo Lumber Revisited
In a vivid reminder that Alamo Lumber'4 is still controlling precedent,
a Texas Court of Appeals, in Lentino v. Cullen Center Bank & Trust,15
confirmed the fear of many practitioners that in the workout setting the
Alamo Lumber opinion would come back to haunt the aggressive lender.
Lentino also demonstrates how difficult it is to purge a contract of usury
once usury exists. In November 1982 Eduardo and Jorge Lentino each
executed separate promissory notes for $150,000 payable to Cullen Bank
to finance their purchase of certain bank stock. In 1984, each of the Len-
tinos, and four other parties, jointly and severally executed a new promis-
sory note in the amount of $2,250,000 (1984 Note), which represented a
renewal and extension of notes made by six of the individuals to finance
the acquisition of the bank stock. In connection with the 1984 Note,
Eduardo and Jorge Lentino also each executed a guaranty agreement in
favor of Cullen Bank that unconditionally and jointly and severally guar-
anteed payment of the note. When the 1984 Note was not paid, Cullen
Bank filed individual suit collect on the note. In response, both Eduardo
and Jorge Lentino entered into separate compromise and settlement
agreements (the Compromise Agreements) with Cullen Bank. Under the
terms of the Compromise Agreements, Eduardo and Jorge Lentino
agreed to execute new promissory notes payable to Cullen Bank in the
amount of $148,842 and $171,186, respectively (the New Notes). The
Compromise Agreements further provided that Cullen Bank would pay
Eduardo and Jorge each $10 and release them of their joint and several
liability under the 1984 Note and guaranty. However, if Eduardo or
Jorge ever defaulted on their New Notes, then the defaulting party would
be liable for the outstanding balance on the 1984 Note. In connection
with the Compromise Agreements, Eduardo and Jorge also waived all
affirmative defenses and causes of action relating to the loan documents
previously executed. Both Eduardo and Jorge Lentino subsequently de-
faulted on their New Notes and Cullen Bank filed separate lawsuits to
collect on the New Notes. The trial court entered final judgment against
the Lentinos and in favor of the bank on each of the New Notes. During
post-judgment discovery, Cullen Bank discovered certain fraudulent
transfers by Jorge and Eduardo Lentino made at the time the Compro-
mise Agreements was entered into. Cullen Bank then filed an additional
suit claiming fraud and breach of contract under the Compromise Agree-
13. Note the provisions of Chapter 15 of the Texas Credit Code, applicable to revolv-
ing credit in Texas, which similarly precludes the payment of any fee. See TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5069-15.02(f) (Vernon 1987).
14. Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold, 661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1983).
15. 919 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
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ments. In response to that suit, the Lentino's filed a counterclaim alleg-
ing usury under the $2,250,000 note.
After the trial court awarded Cullen Bank a verdict on the underlying
Compromise Agreements indicating that the Lentinos owed Cullen Bank
$1,817,525 in actual damages and $2,500,000 in exemplary damages, the
Lentinos appealed asserting usury. They alleged that by being forced to
sign the 1984 Note, in order to get their debt renewed, usury resulted
under the Alamo Lumber case. The court agreed. 16 Note, however, that
unlike the Alamo Lumber case, the transaction complained of did not
involve a loan, but a renewal. This distinction, the Lentino court ac-
knowledged when they indicated that no additional funds were ad-
vanced. 17 However, by refusing a writ of error on this case, the supreme
court has apparently accepted this extension of the Alamo Lumber
doctrine.
Of equal importance the court held that the waiver by the Lentinos of
any affirmative defense, which would include the defense of usury in the
Compromise Agreement, was not enforceable.' 8 Here the court held that
the provisions which allowed the $2,250,000 transaction to be revived
upon the subsequent default by the Lentino under the New Notes failed
to purge the contract of usury. 19 The court pointed out that for a claim or
defense of usury to be compromised or released, the release must be
done in good faith and the usury must be purged.20 The court goes on to
point out that for the underlying contract to be purged of usury, there
must be "(1) cancellation of the obligation tainted by the usury; and (2)
the creation of a new obligation free of usury." 2'
3. Unilateral Charge of Interest
One of this year's usury cases is illustrative of a problem I am con-
stantly noting-it is the unilateral imposition of interest on past due open
accounts at rates in excess of those allowed by the statute dealing with
open account indebtedness where no written agreement concerning the
payment of interest exists. 22 In Dear v. Plastronics, Inc.,23 Dear per-
formed services for Plastronics and issued its invoice for services ren-
dered. The invoice disclosed that Dear charged Plastronics interest on
the outstanding invoice at the rate equal to one percent per month. For
each month that its bill went unpaid, it would add the unpaid interest to
the invoice and then accrue interest for the next month on that com-
16. Id. at 746.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 747
19. Id.
20. Id.; see Finn v. Alexander, 139 Tex. 461, 163 S.W.2d 714, 716 (1942).
21. Id.; see Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County S&D, Inc., 516 S.W.2d 136, 137
(Tex. 1979); Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531, 534 (1940), over-
ruled on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977) and O'Quinn v. Beanland, 540 S.W.2d
526, 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
22. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987).
23. 913 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
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pounded figure. As the court points out, since there was no agreement to
pay interest, Dear was entitled only to the statutorily authorized simple
interest at six percent, commencing thirty days after the debt was due.24
However, by charging interest at a rate equal to one percent per month,
or twelve percent per year and then compounding that rate, Dear was
charging interest slightly in excess of twelve percent per year. Conse-
quently, the open account debtor was entitled to a finding that Dear was
charging usurious interest, as the court found that not only was the com-
pounding not agreed to in writing, no written agreement authorized the
charging of interest.25 The practice of unilaterally charging interest on
invoices is widespread throughout the state and this case serves as a re-
minder to practitioners that it is a violation of the usury statutes to im-
pose such interest without a written agreement. Where the interest
charges exceed twice the statutorily allowed maximum of 6% a year (for
example where the invoice charges 1.5% per month or 18% per year) the
penalties for usury include the forfeiture of all principal, as well as all
interest charged.26 But note the revisions to Article 5069-1.06, which oc-
curred during the 1995 Legislative session, and allow a party guilty of
usury, who discovers the problem and corrects it before an action is
brought by the obligor, to purge the contract of usury.27
C. SALE OF INSURANCE
The 1996 Supreme Court opinion in Barnett Bank v. Nelson28 is just the
latest salvo in a long running battle between the insurance industry and
commercial banks.29 This battle goes back to 1916 when the National
Banking Act was amended authorizing national banks located in a place
where the population does not exceed 5,000 inhabitants to act as the
agent for any fire, life or other insurance company. 30 This provision was
placed in the National Bank Act at the urging of the Comptroller of the
Currency who was concerned about the difficulty that national banks in
small communities were having in earning a profit. This provision was
intended to provide those banks with an additional source of revenue.
In 1971, the Comptroller adopted regulations which permitted national
banks to sell insurance from small town branches, even if their main of-
fice was located in a city with a population greater than 5,000.31
In 1986, the Comptroller ruled in an interpretive letter that national
banks could sell insurance on a nationwide basis from a branch located in
24. Id.
25. Dear, 913 S.W.2d at 254.
26. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1987).
27. Id. at art. 5069-1.06(4)(a).
28. 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996).
29. This battle has been described as a "huge commercial tug-of-war." Alabama Ass'n
of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
30. National Banking Act, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 753 (1916) (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 92 (1994)).
31. 12 C.F.R. 7.7100 (1993) (current version at 61 Fed. Reg. 4849 (1996)).
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a small town.32 This interpretation has been upheld by the courts.33 It is
against this backdrop that the Barnett Bank case must be reviewed. It
had the effect of clarifying the impact of the McCarran-Ferguson Act of
1944. The McCarran-Ferguson Act 34 was passed in response to a 1944
U.S. Supreme Court decision 35 that held that the business of insurance
constituted interstate commerce. That Supreme Court decision had the
effect of applying the Sherman Act to the sale of insurance. McCarran-
Ferguson promotes the regulation of the business of insurance by the
states by providing that "no Act of Congress shall be construed to invali-
date, impair or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance .... unless such Act specifically re-
lates to the business of insurance. ' 36 Thus, McCarran-Ferguson acts as an
anti-preemption statute, with the effect of denying normal federal pre-
emption of a state law if it is enacted for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance unless the federal law specifically relates to the
business of insurance.
What the Barnett Bank case did was to hold that section 92 of the Na-
tional Bank Act was a federal law that specifically relates to the business
of insurance thereby allowing it to preempt state law.37 As a result, it is
clear now that any qualifying national bank can sell insurance. A qualify-
ing national bank is one that has a branch in a town of 5,000 inhabitants
or less. By virtue of the parity provision of the Texas Constitution, a state
chartered bank can likewise sell insurance. 38
Notwithstanding Barnett Bank, the Texas Insurance Code would not
permit the licensing of banks to sell insurance.3 9 Moving to address the
situation, the Texas Department of Insurance has issued interim proce-
dures for banks selling insurance. Those interim procedures provide that
a bank located and doing business in a place of less than 5,000 inhabitants
may become a licensed corporate agent or it may acquire all or part of a
licensed agency located and doing business in a town of less than 5,000
inhabitants.40 Many operational details remain to be determined.4 1
32. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 366 [1985-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986).
33. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
NBD Bank, N.A. v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 1995).
34. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1976).
35. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
36. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).
37. Barnett Bank 116 S. Ct. at 1108.
38. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 16(c); see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-3.010
(Vernon 1995).
39. TEX. INs. CODE ANN. art. 21.07-1 (Vernon 1981).
40. Tex. Commissioner's Bulletin No. B-0043-96 (June 20, 1996).
41. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has stated its position in a advisory
letter. Guidance to National Banks in Insurance and Annuity Sales Activities, OCC Advi-
sory Letter No. 96-8; [1996 Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 35,463 (Oct. 8, 1996).
See also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 753, Current Matters Volume Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 81,107 (Nov. 4, 1996).
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Another battle looms when Barnett Bank is considered in conjunction
with the 1995 Supreme Court case of NationsBank v. Variable Annuity
Life Insurance Co. (VALIC). 42 In VALIC, the United States Supreme
Court said that national banks were authorized to sell annuities, both
fixed and variable. The source of this authority was the incidental powers
clause of the National Bank Act 43 and the Comptroller's reasonable de-
termination that annuities were an investment product and not insurance.
Texas banks, both national and state-chartered, that wished to exercise
their authority to sell annuities were met with the same licensing barriers
in the Texas Insurance Code as had, prior to Barnett Bank and the Insur-
ance Commissioner's interim procedures, prevented insurance sales. The
OCC opined that Texas licensing provisions were preempted. '4
Relying on McCarran-Ferguson, the Texas Department of Insurance
did not develop procedures for bank sales of annuities. The Texas Bank-
ers Association sued in the Federal District Court in Austin45 seeking a
declaratory judgment that the Texas Insurance Code was preempted to
the extent that it prohibits or substantially interferes with the rights of
banks to sell annuities. The case is pending and should be closely
monitored.
D. FORECLOSURE OF DEED OF TRUST LIENS IN REAL PROPERTY
1. Counting the Days
Notwithstanding the much needed clarification to this issue, afforded by
the 1993 amendments to the Property Code (indicating that no matter
what time of day you post or mail you include that day as a full day in
computing the twenty-one day notice period 46), the issue of how to count
days continues to plague the courts. While section 51.002 of the Property
Code does not have an express provision concerning how you compute
the twenty-one day notice period, a court has pointed out that you can
rely on the Code Construction Act which provides "[i]n computing a pe-
riod of days, the first day is excluded and the last day is included. '47 In
citing this statute as controlling, the court applied the statute by indicat-
ing the sale is the first day of the period and it is to be excluded and then
42. 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994).
44. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 749, Current Matters Volume Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 91 81,114 (Sept. 13, 1996).
45. Texas Bankers Ass'n & Broadway Ass'n v. Elton Bomer in His Capacity as Ins.
Comm'r, NOA No. A-96-CA-694-JN (W. Dist. Tex. filed Oct. 8, 1996).
46. Act of Sept. 1 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 48, § 5 (1993) (codified at TEx. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 1995)) (intending to overrule the hypertechnical holdings of
earlier cases such as In re Nelson 134 B.R. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) that held if you
mailed your notice at 4:00 p.m. and conducted your foreclosure at 2:00 p.m. 21 days later
you gave insufficient notice).
47. TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 311.014(a) (Vernon 1988).
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you count backwards. 48 Thus, in this case where the posting occurred,
counting backwards, on the twenty-first day prior to the foreclosure, ex-
cluding the day of the foreclosure from the days counted, the court held
that the twenty-one day notice requirement was complied with.49 This
case, coupled with the 1993 amendment to the Property Code overruling
the "time of day" cases should bring needed certainty to this issue.
2. Notice to Guarantors
This year the courts have again had an opportunity to address the ques-
tion of when notice to a guarantor is required when an interest in real
property is being foreclosed. This issue was addressed in Bishop v. Na-
tional Loan Investors, L.P.,50 a well reasoned opinion, which held that the
Article 9 cases which require notice to a guarantor of foreclosure do not
apply when the lien being foreclosed is a lien in real property.
5 1
This is to be contrasted with the long line of cases requiring notice to a
guarantor where the collateral is covered by Article 9.52 The reason for
the distinction in the treatment of guarantors is not so much the require-
ment in section 9.504, that an Article 9 foreclosure be conducted in a
commercially reasonable fashion, as it is the broad definition of "debtor"
contained in Article 9. In an effort to interject an element of fairness and
notice, Article 9 defines a debtor to mean any person who owes payment
or other performance of the obligation, including, specifically, the owner
of any collateral where the borrower and the owner of the collateral are
not the same person.53 It is on this basis that the courts have held a guar-
antor is entitled to notice of an Article 9 foreclosure. 54
However, if you compare the language in the Property Code to that
used in Article 9, you will see that there is little difference. Just as the
provisions of Article 9 impose an obligation on the lienholder to give
notice of the foreclosure to anyone who is obligated on the debt, the pro-
visions of the Property Code impose on the holder of the debt the obliga-
tion to give notice of the sale "on each Debtor who, according to the
records of the holder of the debt, is obligated to pay the debt."'55 Accord-
ingly, the analysis in Bishop, based in part on the language of the guar-
anty (which contains a waiver of notice), and prior case law in this state
dealing with the rights of an unconditional guarantor (i.e., that a uncondi-
tional guarantor is primarily liable for repayment and not just a surety of
performance) overlook the fact that the same type of language is in most
48. University Woods Apartments, Inc. v. McDill, No. 01-92-00779-CV, 1996 WL
38986, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29, 1996, no writ) (not designated for
publication).
49. Id.
50. 915 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1995, writ denied).
51. Id. at 245.
52. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lanier, 926 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1991); Adams v. Wal-
drop, 740 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ).
53. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 9.105(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
54. See, e.g., Lanier, 926 F.2d at 464; Adams, 740 S.W.2d at 33.
55. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b)(3) (Vernon 1984).
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pledge agreements and in most guaranty agreements, whether used in
connection with a loan secured by real estate or a loan secured by per-
sonal property while the language of the Property Code may not reach a
mere pledgor, it is difficult to see how it does not encompass a guarantor.
Accordingly, the practitioner would be well advised, notwithstanding the
language of any guaranty agreement to give notice to all guarantors of
any foreclosure of a deed of trust lien.
These cases should be contrasted with a situation where a guarantor or
pledgor delivers to the bank collateral in partial satisfaction of the debt.
In Acuff v. Lamesa National Bank,56 a co-borrower "sold" his stock and
certificates of deposit to the bank in partial satisfaction of a debt. There-
after, in a deficiency action against the other co-borrower, that co-bor-
rower argued that the bank was not entitled to a deficiency judgment
because it failed to give him notice of the disposition of stock and certifi-
cates of deposit. Here the court properly held that where there was no
foreclosure by the lender in the collateral, but an acceptance of it in par-
tial satisfaction of the debt, no notice to the co-borrower was required. 57
3. Commercially Reasonable Standard
Similarly an attempt by a borrower to impose upon a beneficiary under
a deed of trust the obligation to conduct a real property foreclosure in a
commercially reasonable manner met with failure.58 The court while ac-
knowledging that personal property must be foreclosed on a commer-
cially reasonable manner in order for a creditor to recover a deficiency,
held that foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need not be at
a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially
reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable. 59
While this holding answers many questions concerning the deed of
trust lienholder's requirement to advertise, prepare the property for sale,
etc., it does not address the issue which remains under Article 9 as a re-
sult of the provisions of section 9.501, which allow a creditor to proceed,
where the collateral is both real and personal property, in accordance
with its rights and remedies in respect to the real property.60 While this
statute indicates that a foreclosure of real and personal property in ac-
cordance with a lender's rights as to the real property, leaves the provi-
sions of Subchapter E of Article 9 inapplicable, 61 the author is aware of
no construction of this issue in any jurisdiction, like Texas, which has no
appraisal, redemption or other protections to a borrower or guarantor
56. 919 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996, no writ).
57. Id. at 157.
58. Sowell v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 14-92-00320-CV, 1996 WL 233727 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14 Dist.] May 9, 1996, no writ) (not released for publication).
59. Id. at *3.
60. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.501(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
61. Subchapter E contains, among other provisions, the provisions creating the obliga-
tion to foreclose in a commercially reasonable manner. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9.504(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
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from a deficiency claim where the lender first proceeds against collateral
which is a mixture of real and personal property in a manner that is not
commercially reasonable.
4. Cancellation of a Foreclosure
Demonstrating that because of the harsh remedies available through
non-judicial foreclosure, a foreclosing party should proceed only with a
good understanding of the facts, the courts held in Bonilla v. Roberson
that there was no such thing as the "cancellation" of a previously con-
ducted foreclosure. 62 In this case, the beneficiary under the deed of trust
conducted a foreclosure at which the beneficiary was the successful bid-
der, having bid $80,000 for two tracts of land. After the sale, the benefici-
ary entered upon the property and discovered extensive damage thereto.
After the foreclosure, the party who had acted as Substitute Trustee exe-
cuted deeds purporting to rescind the first sale and a subsequent foreclo-
sure was conducted at which the property was again purchased by the
beneficiary, this time at a price of $42,500.63 Noting that a Substitute
Trustee's power arises solely from the Deed of Trust, the court held that
once the foreclosure is conducted, the Trustee's power is extinguished
and the beneficiary must live with the outcome of the first foreclosure. 64
5. Election of Remedies and the Doctrine of Merger
A large gap in the jurisprudence of Texas was closed in In re Gayle.65
In this case Judge Greendyke does an excellent job of describing the elec-
tion of remedies and the merger doctrine and their current application in
Texas. After first noting that the classic construction of the doctrine of
election of remedies requires a creditor to make an election between pur-
suing a judicial foreclosure and non-judicial foreclosure, 66 the court ex-
amines the impact of this doctrine on self-help foreclosure remedies
conducted after a judgment on a debt has been obtained. The court con-
cludes that, because the language of Article 9 provides that a creditor
may, upon default, reduce his claim to judgment, foreclosure or otherwise
enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure, 67 the
doctrine of election of remedies does not preclude a creditor from con-
ducting a self-help foreclosure on personal property after obtaining a
judgment on the debt.68 Judge Greendyke then notes that the issue
presented by In re Gayle, the right of a bank to non-judicially foreclose a
deed of trust lien in real property, after the creditor has first obtained a
judgment on the debt, is a case of first impression in Texas.69 While there
62. Bonilla v. Roberson, 918 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
63. Id. at 20.
64. Id. at 22.
65. 189 B.R. 914 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1995).
66. Id. at 916.
67. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.501(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
68. In re Gayle, 189 B.R. at 917.
69. Id. at 916.
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is no statute dealing with real estate which compares with the provisions
of section 9.501(a) of Article 9, in considering this issue, the court notes
that the right to foreclose should only be barred by the actual satisfaction
of the underlying debt.70 Since the lien of the deed of trust should still
attach to the real property, until the debt is satisfied, the court further
notes that if the doctrine of election of remedies prevented a mortgagee
from foreclosing on its real property lien after a successful suit on the
debt, but after an unsuccessful attempt at obtaining satisfaction on the
judgment through collection efforts, the mortgagee's success in a suit to
enforce a debt would be meaningless.71 A debtor would have no incen-
tive to satisfy a mortgagee's judgment on a note knowing that if they
could frustrate the collection efforts they would be insulated from a later
foreclosure on a previously and validly granted lien.
Obviously the correlating doctrine of merger must also be examined in
this setting. In fact, the debtors in this case asserted as a defense the
bank's inability to maintain its deed of trust lien after its contractual debt
was merged into the judgment.72 The doctrine of merger provides that
when a valid and final judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the
plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original claim or any
part thereof, although he may be able to maintain an action upon the
judgment. 73 Here the court notes that while the debt maybe merged into
the judgment, the deed of trust lien remains unsatisfied and so long as
that claim remains unsatisfied, the right to pursue a non-judicial foreclo-
sure exists. 74 While the court notes that this is a case of first impression
in Texas, it clarifies a situation that frequently arises in workouts and
foreclosures where multiple pieces of collateral exist.
Query-whether the outcome would be the same if the property was
homestead, suggesting that the debt now being foreclosed on, a judgment
debt, is not the same debt (the purchase money) that was initially the
debt which secured the deed of trust?
E. CATTLE AUCTION AS RECOGNIZED MARKET
This year's review also produces a case which suggests that it may be
possible for a cattle auction to meet the requirements of a "recognized"
market for purposes of section 9.504 of the UCC, thereby alleviating the
secured creditor from the obligation to give the debtor notice of the time,
manner or method of a foreclosure sale of collateral. 75 Here the court
reviews the various elements which would need to be demonstrated prior
to a cattle auction being held as a recognized market. While the facts of
this case did not supply the court with enough information to make a
70. Id. at 919.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 920.
74. Id. at 921.




determination, the court notes that there was insufficient evidence on is-
sues such as are how are the cattle auctioned-in mass or by lot? Were
the cattle in the same condition as other cattle being offered for sale at
that auction? What advertising occurred with regard to the auction?76
The court goes on to note however, that a true "recognized market" is
rare and that for cattle to meet that test may be difficult since no two
cows are the same, whereas each share of IBM stock traded on an ex-
change has the same value that any other share would have.77 I would
suggest otherwise. Because of the expense and delay associated with con-
ducting commercially reasonable sales a community standards test should
be adopted allowing a creditor to dispose of collateral in any market the
creditor can demonstrate is, in that local, a known, open market dealing
in similar goods. For the courts to require the New York Stock Exchange
equivalent will result in an almost complete judicial emasculation of the
"recognized market" exception 78 to the requirement that the debtor re-
ceive notice of foreclosure. The court here appears to fall into the trap of
equating a recognized market with a market of a type which is the subject
of widely distributed standard price quotations. The exception for notice
to the debtor applies if the type of property is customarily sold on a rec-
ognized market. 79 However, the same section of the statute distinguishes
between a recognized market and a market which is subject to widely
distributed price quotations.80 Thus, the drafters of the code drew a dis-
tinction between recognized market and "New York Stock Exchange"
type markets where there are widely distributed price quotations on fun-
gible goods.
F. ARBITRATION WAIVER
Last year's Article reviewed cases concerning the enforceability of ar-
bitration clauses. This year's cases demonstrate again that arbitration
clauses are favored by the courts. In Moore v. Morris,81 the court demon-
strates to what extent arbitration is favored when it is the agreed remedy
between parties. In this case, the plaintiff instituted, in 1993, a lawsuit
claiming misrepresentation and violation of the DTPA. The defendant
moved to abate the suit and compel arbitration. In 1994, the court or-
dered the case abated pending the completion of arbitration. Subse-
quently, neither party took any action to initiate arbitration. In April of
1995, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the Order of Abatement
alleging that the defendant had waived its right to arbitration by failing to
76. Id. at 182.
77. Id. at 183.
78. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
79. Id.
80. Section 9.504 provides, "The secured party may buy at any public sale and if the
collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is the
subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy at a private sale." TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) (emphasis added).
81. 931 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
19971
SMU LAW REVIEW
initiate the arbitration proceedings. While the trial courts set aside the
order of abatement and refused to compel arbitration, the appellate court
held the burden is on the party seeking relief to begin the arbitration
process when the other party has properly asserted its right to arbitra-
tion.82 This is an interesting and compelling outcome demonstrating the
court's difference to the parties' contractual intent to arbitrate, given that
the plaintiff brought its action by lawsuit and the defendant requested
that the suit be abated and subject to arbitration and then the defendant
failed to initiate the arbitration.
G. FIRREA SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
This year again presents a case interpreting under what circumstances
the six-year statute of limitations created by the Financial Institutions Re-
form Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) applies. In Cadle Co. v.
1007 Joint Venture, the court held that the assignee of a promissory note
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver of a
failed bank, does not automatically have standing to assert claims under
that promissory note after the then applicable time bar under Texas law
runs where the instrument was not in default at the time it was assigned
by the FDIC.83 This opinion highlights the necessity to examine the ap-
plication of the FIRREA's language as it relates to the extension of limi-
tations by noting that under the language of the statute, in order for the
six-year period of limitations to apply, the note in issue must be in default
either before the FDIC acquired it or while the FDIC owned it.84
However, other recent Texas cases are in accord with the Texas
Supreme Court ruling in Jackson v. Thweatt85 that the six-year statute of
limitations is applicable to the FDIC successor's where that successor
demonstrates that the requirements of FIRREA are met.86
Presumably, the adoption during the 1995 Legislative session of the re-
visions of Article 3, including section 3.118, which creates a six-year stat-
ute of limitations on instruments, and the provisions in section 3.101
which causes the amendments to be applicable to any cause of action
accruing after the adoption of the amendments, will make moot any FIR-
REA based assignee claims, to the extent that they arose after the adop-
tion of the revisions to Article 3.87 Note since the extended statute of
limitations created by section 3.118 applies only to negotiable instru-
ments, the provisions of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sec-
tion 16.003(a) and section 16.004(a) will continue to have application to
82. Id. at 728.
83. Cadle Co. v. 1007 Joint Venture, 82 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. 1996).
84. Id. at 105.
85. 883 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. 1994).
86. See Holstein v. Federal Debt Management, Inc., 902 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.) 1995, no writ); AmWest Sav. Ass'n v. Shatto, 905 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1995, writ denied).




non-negotiable instruments. Furthermore the provisions of Chapter 51 of
the Texas Property Code limiting two years from the date of foreclosure,
the time period in which a deficiency action can be brought, will continue
to have application.88
H. DTPA
Each year the banking practitioner must check to see what, if any, in-
roads have been made to the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Riverside
National Bank v. Lewis89 that the Texas Deceptive Practices Act (DTPA)
does not apply to a transaction involving the mere lending of money, and
that the DTPA applies only to the sale of a good or service. 90 This year is
no exception.
In Humble National Bank v. DCV, Inc.91 the plaintiff, a company that
had been defrauded out of money by its dishonest bookkeeper, alleged
that the bank violated the DTPA by allowing the bookkeeper to ex-
change checks made payable to his employer for cashiers checks payable
to a fictitious company controlled by the bookkeeper. A trial court ver-
dict that the bank was guilty of violating the DTPA by allowing the com-
pany's bookkeeper, who was not an authorized officer of the company
(according to corporate resolutions the company had on file with the
bank), to exchange the check, was overturned on appeal. The trial court's
jury verdict was based upon a breach of an express warranty under the
DTPA. Apparently the jury determined that the bank's marketing slogan
"A Tradition of Excellence" and policy of "know your customer" gave
rise to a warranty that the bank would only allow authorized officers of
the company to transact business at the bank. The appellate court found
that the bank's failure to abide by the provisions of the corporate resolu-
tion on file was simply a breach of contract and not a breach of any ex-
press or implied warranty. 92 Efforts by the company to draw the bank
within the reaches of the DTPA through the bank's slogan "A Tradition
of Excellence" and its policy of "knowing its customer" failed because
those actions did not represent warranties but merely opinion or puffing
and lacked the specificity required to create an actionable warranty claim
under the DTPA.93
Thus, this case demonstrates that even where a service (the payment of
checks) is involved, a warranty must be made by the bank to give rise to
an actionable claim.
This year's cases also provide a case which supports the Riverside view
that transactions solely relating to the granting or denial of a credit facil-
88. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 51.003-.005 (Vernon 1995).
89. 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980).
90. Id. at 174.
91. 933 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.).
92. Id. at 237.
93. Id. at 229.
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ity do not give rise to a claim under the DTPA.94 In Clardy, the appellate
court is asked to address what constitutes "loan services." The Texas
Supreme Court in Riverside, while acknowledging that the mere lending
of money is not the sale of a good or service for purposes of the DTPA,
held that there could be situations where a bank provides loan services
which would represent the sale of a good or service. 95 In Clardy, a pro-
spective customer sought credit from a lender and after conducting a re-
view of the prospective company's financial information, the lender
issued, and the prospective borrower accepted, a proposal letter. The
proposal letter set forth the financial accommodations that the lender
would be willing to consider. It also contained in bold print the statement
"THIS PROPOSAL LETTER IS NOT A COMMITMENT TO LEND."
The prospective borrower, acknowledging that the proposal letter con-
tains conditions, asserts that once it met those conditions it was entitled
to a loan. 96 When the lender ultimately failed to fund the loan, the pro-
spective borrower brought an action claiming that it qualified under the
DTPA because it sought to purchase loan services from the lender. The
court properly points out though that the loan application process here
was not the objective or goal of the prospective borrower, its goal was the
loan. 97 In fact, the loan services here, the due diligence review of the
prospective borrower, was solely for the benefit of the lender. Thus, the
prospective borrower does not qualify under the DTPA as it was not
seeking a good or service in connection with the application and due dili-
gence process.
This year's cases also produced two additional cases which, while they
both hold that the bank has no liability, illustrate inroads to the Riverside
case and identify areas where banks have DTPA exposure. In these two
cases the bank was not the seller of goods or services but they were "in-
tertwined" with the sale of a good or service to a consumer. It is the
Texas Supreme Court's view that a person need not seek or require goods
or services from the parties sued in order to meet the DTPA definition of
a consumer as to that party.98 In Inglish v. Union State Bank,99 the con-
sumer purchased cattle from a customer of the bank and inquired of the
bank as to whether or not the bank held a lien on the cattle being
purchased and whether or not the seller was a good customer. The
bank's response was that it held no lien on the cattle being sold and that
the seller had not been a problem customer. It turns out that the seller
had previously sold the cattle and that the bank did hold a lien on the
cattle. However, since there was no evidence that the bank sought to
94. Clardy Mfg. Co. v. Marine Midland Business Loans, 88 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir.
1996).
95. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175.
96. Clardy, 88 F.3d at 353.
97. Id. at 356.
98. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tex. 1981).
99. 911 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 40 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 234 (Jan. 10, 1997).
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enjoy the benefits of the sale of the cattle, and the bank neither en-
couraged nor discouraged the cattle purchase, (apparently the buyers in-
quiry occurred after he had contracted to purchase the cattle) there was
no showing that the bank had a sufficient relationship to the transaction
or sought to enjoy the benefits of the transaction in order to be a seller of
goods or services under the DTPA.100
Similarly, in Brown v. Bank of Galveston National Ass'n,101 the mere
assignment of the Builder's and Mechanics Liens Contract to a bank, who
did enjoy the lien which had been granted in favor of the builder, did not
so inextricably intertwine the bank in the transaction, so as to make the
bank a proper party.102 Under the inextricably intertwined cases, there
must be a showing that the extension of credit forms the means of making
the sale or purchase. 10 3 As a further test under this doctrine, the creditor
must be shown to have some connection either with the actual sales trans-
action or the deceptive act relating to financing the transaction. 1°4
Apparently, in Brown, the appellant did not challenge the trial court's
finding that the contractor and the bank were not inextricably inter-
twined, nor did Brown advance this theory of recovery in the trial court.
Thus, the outcome in this case bore more of a relationship to the manner
in which it was pled and proven than it does to enlighten the inextricably
intertwined doctrine. In fact, the facts of this case are similar to the facts
of the Flenniken case, where the Texas Supreme Court found that the
bank and the builder and the Flennikens were inextricably intertwined in
a similar assignment of builders and mechanics lien case.
I. BANK'S FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION ON AN INDIVIDUAL
RETIREMENT ACCOUNT
The legal relationship between a bank, which permits the establishment
of an individual retirement account (IRA), and the party that establishes
that account were recently reviewed and the result was a holding that the
bank's role did not give rise to the bank acting as the holder of legal title
to property maintained in an IRA.10 5 In this case, Colvin maintained in
an individual retirement account, a two percent overriding royalty inter-
est in the minerals of some producing property. The operator of the well
paid all of Colvin's royalties directly to the bank for further credit into
the IRA maintained in Colvin's name at the bank. Colvin subsequently
sold his overriding royalty interests. The purchaser sought recovery from
the bank of those funds in Colvin's IRA which represented royalties paid
after the date of sale. The bank asserted that any attempted assignment
by Colvin was ineffective, since the bank as the holder of legal title was
100. Id. at 834.
101. 930 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ granted).
102. Id. at 144.
103. Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1983).
104. Home Sav. Ass'n v. Guerra, 733 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. 1987).
105. Colvin v. Alta Mesa Resources, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
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the only party who could acknowledge and consent to a sale. Instead the
court held that the IRA was more like a safety deposit box than a trust
and held that the party that established the IRA account was free to con-
vey the contents thereof without authorization or joinder from the
bank. l0 6
J. GARNISHMENT
This Survey brings us two interesting garnishment cases. In Westerman
v. Comerica Bank-Texas, 0 7 a judgment creditor garnished Westerman's
account at Comerica and Comerica paid the judgment creditor the bal-
ance on deposit in Westerman's account. Westerman appealed the defaultjudgment which gave rise to the garnishment and the default judgment
was set aside by the appellate court. Westerman then brought an action
against Comerica asserting that the bank improperly performed its af-
firmative duties to him as a customer to assert his defenses and to investi-
gate the underlying garnishment writ before complying with it. The court
held that Comerica held no duty to assert any defenses or to investigate
the underlying writ before compliance and noted that Chapter 63.001 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that a writ of gar-
nishment is available if the plaintiff has a valid subsisting judgment.'0 8
Westerman also argued that the garnishment was improper because the
underlying judgment was later set aside. The court held that the garnish-
ment argument was not grounds for recovery against Comerica which, as
the recipient of a garnishment, would have no way of knowing the out-
come of any possible appeal on the underlying judgment.'0 9 Finally,
Westerman argued that Comerica was required to give him notice of the
writ before it complied with it, thereby giving Westerman an opportunity
to preserve the funds he had in his account by asserting his various reme-
dies against the judgment debtor before that money was paid over to thejudgment creditor. The court noted, however, that there is no rule or
statute that requires a garnishee to provide notice to the judgment debtor
that garnishment proceedings have been initiated against his property." 0
The other garnishment case involves the scope of the garnishee's duty
to investigate and/or turn over funds that may belong to the judgment
debtor. In Overton Bank and Trust N.A. v. PaineWebber, Inc.,"' a judg-
ment creditor filed an application for garnishment in which he stated that
he:
had reason to believe, and does believe, that Garnishee is indebted
to or has in hand effects belonging to Elsbree [the judgment debtor],
which are being held nominally in the name of Remington Group,
Inc. (Remington). This indebtedness includes, but is not limited to,
106. Id. at 691.
107. 928 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
108. Id. at 681.
109. Id. at 682.
110. Id.
111. 922 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
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all effects or monies held by Remington Group in account numbers
60009092 and 60009498.112
The actual writ of garnishment lists only Elsbree as the judgment debtor.
The bank, however, in response to the writ, admitted it had deposit funds
in account number 60009092, but the account was styled Remington
Group, Inc. and that Elsbree was one of the authorized signors on that
account. However, the bank did not freeze or place a hold on that ac-
count. The court noted that the supreme court had previously held that a
bank subject to a writ of garnishment may rely on its deposit agreement
when determining to whom it is indebted. 113 Thus, the fact that Elsbree
was a signatory on a corporate account did not alter the contractual rela-
tionship between the bank and that corporate customer. The court fur-
ther pointed out that if the creditor wants to challenge title in the funds
held by a third party, the creditor must seek a writ of garnishment naming
the nominal owner, and it would then be the court's responsibility, not
the bank's responsibility, to determine true ownership. 14
K. SECTION 26.02 NOTICES
In an effort to stem the tide of the then rising number of lender liability
cases, the Legislature in 1989 passed the so-called "Super Merger Clause"
statute. 115 This statute provides, among other things, that no terms of a
loan agreement, in which the amount to be lent exceeds $50,000, are en-
forceable unless they are in writing.116 The statute goes on to provide
that if the lender gives the appropriate written notice, the terms of any
such loan agreement cannot be varied by oral agreements that occur
before or contemporaneous with the execution of loan documents.17
In an interesting attempt to introduce oral testimony, the Plaintiff's in
Maginn v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc."l 8 alleged that the failure of the finan-
cial institution to post the notices required by section 26.02(g) of the stat-
ute prevented the financial institution from raising the statute as a
defense. Section 26.02(g) of the statute provides:
All financial institutions shall conspicuously post notices that inform
borrowers of the provisions of this section. The notices shall be lo-
cated in such manner and in places in the institutions so as to fully
inform borrowers of the provisions of this section. The Finance
Commission of Texas shall prescribe the language of the notice." 9
However, the court notes in reviewing the statute that while the statute
provides that the failure to place in the loan documents the required writ-
ten notice that there are no oral agreements between the parties results in
112. Id. at 312.
113. Id. (citing Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Sunbelt Say., 824 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1992)).
114. Overton, 922 S.W.2d at 313-14.
115. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1989).
116. Id § 26.02(b).
117. Id. § 26.02(d).
118. 919 8.W.2d 164 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
119. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02(g) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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the inability of the financial institution to keep out oral testimony, the
legislature imposed no penalty for failure to post the notice required by
section 26.02(g). The author takes great comfort in this court's holding
as, despite the author's visit to numerous banks, the author has yet to see
a section 26.02 notice posted.
L. DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
A bank which obtains a customer's approval, in a credit card applica-
tion, to disclose its credit experience with others, has a qualified or condi-
tional privilege subsequently to disclose its credit experience.' 20
However, in the Calhoun case the court points out that this privilege can
be lost where false information is disseminated and such dissemination is
made with malice.12' The court goes on to point out that to show malice,
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the statements were
made with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard to
the truth.122
III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CHANGES
A. FEDERAL
1. Subchapter S Elections
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,123 together with prior
amendments to Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, have finally
provided an effective mechanism by which certain financial institutions
can achieve partnership tax treatment. Last year's Survey reflected that
the efforts to create in Texas a limited banking association had failed as a
result of the IRS' private letter ruling which indicated that any bank or-
ganized as a Texas limited partnership would not be classified as a part-
nership for tax purposes. 124 While the limits on the mechanism provided
for in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, by which a bank can
make a Subchapter S election, do not provide as much flexibility as the
earlier Texas effort, they do provide relief for closely held banks.
In order to obtain partnership tax treatment a bank must qualify for
the Subchapter S treatment and file with the IRS a Subchapter S election.
A Subchapter S election requires the consent of all the shareholders, but
once made, the income of the business is directly taxed to its shareholders
whether distributed or not.125 To be eligible, the bank must be a domes-
tic corporation having no more than one class of stock outstanding, no
nonresident alien as a shareholder, and no shareholder that is not an indi-
120. Calhoun v. Chase Manhattan Bank (U.S.A.), N.A., 911 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
121. Id. at 409.
122. Id.
123. Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1101, 110 Stat. 1755 (Aug. 20, 1996).
124. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-51-032 (Sept. 27, 1995).
125. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994).
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vidual.126 A bank can make the Subchapter S election for any tax year
beginning January 1, 1997. On that date, and as a result of The Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, the limitation on the maximum
number of shareholders a Subchapter S corporation can have increases
from thirty-five to seventy-five.' 27 While banks become eligible, if they
meet the above criteria, to make a Subchapter S election, their use of the
reserve method of accounting for bad debt will disqualify them from the
advantages of Subchapter S.128
The obvious benefit of making a Subchapter S election, where divi-
dends are distributed, is to eliminate the federal income tax on the net
income of the bank and the double tax that occurs when dividends are
paid to shareholders and taxed again at the shareholder level as income.
This is a benefit that banks have long sought, and now that it has been
achieved represents welcome tax relief that has long been available to
closely held corporations that were not financial institutions.
2. Golden Parachutes
Effective April 1, 1996, the federal regulators adopted final regulations
which limit, in certain circumstances, the types and amounts of "golden
parachutes" that can be provided by banks without the regulators prior
written approval.' 29 Golden parachutes are defined to be any plan by
which IAPs130 receive certain severance payments. The regulation does
not include payments which are made pursuant to a pension or retire-
ment plan, payments that are made pursuant to a defined benefit plan,' 3 '
any payment made pursuant to a bona fide deferred compensation
plan,132 a payment made by reason of death or termination by disability,
or a payment made pursuant to a nondiscriminatory severance pay plan
or arrangement which provides for payment of severance benefits to all
eligible employees. 133
The limits on golden parachute payments apply to "troubled financial
institutions" which include a bank which has a CAMEL Rating of 4 or 5
or is subject to a proceeding to terminate its insurance.' 34 Where a pay-
ment is made it may not exceed twelve months' salary, provided, how-
ever, that any insured deposit institution subject to a CAMEL Rating of 4
or 5 must obtain the consent of its primary federal regulator prior to mak-
126. Id. § 1361(b)(1)(A).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 1361(b)(2)(A).
129. 12 C.F.R. § 359.1-.5 (1996).
130. IAP's (Institutionally Affiliated Parties) are defined to include any director, of-
ficer, employee or controlling stockholder. See 12 C.F.R. § 359.1(h) (1996).
131. E.g., an employee welfare benefit plan as defined in § 3(1) of the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1996).
132. E.g., a voluntary election to defer pledges as set forth in the regulation at 12 C.F.R.
§ 359.1(d) (1996).
133. See id. § 359.1(f)(2).
134. Id. § 359.1(f)(ii)(D) & (E).
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ing such a payment.135
Unlike the restrictions on golden parachute payments, the restrictions
on indemnification apply to all insured institutions.136 However, the limi-
tations on indemnifications deal only with administrative proceedings or
civil actions initiated against an IAP by any federal banking agency.137
Similar to the provisions of the Texas Banking Act of 1995, and its prede-
cessor, this regulation requires an affirmative act by the non-interested
board members before the acts of a particular IAP can be indemnified. 138
Indemnification of an IAP is permitted in administrative or civil enforce-
ment actions under several situations, including where the board deter-
mines, after investigation, that the best interests of the institution would
be served and the safety and soundness of the institution would not be
adversely affected. 139 Obviously, a heavy burden is put on the non-inter-
ested directors before they can safely offer such an indemnification. 40
B. STATE
1. Policy Memoranda
After the passage of the Texas Banking Act of 1995 the State Banking
Department continued its process of updating and reviewing the regula-
tory environment within which state banks operate. This resulted in the
announcement by the Texas Banking Department that of the twenty
seven existing policies fifteen would be rescinded and the remaining
twelve were substantially rewritten. 14' Among the policies which were
rescinded was the policy that state banks must maintain a primary capital
ratio of at least six percent. The removal of this state requirement means
that state banks in Texas are subject to the federal minimum capital re-
quirements142 which provide a more liberal capital requirement. This
constitutes a significant liberalization of the capital requirements applica-
ble to tax chartered banks in Texas.
After the Commissioner's action in rescinding the twenty-seven ex-
isting policies, the twelve remaining policies were published and are num-
135. Id. § 359.4(a)(3).
136. Id. § 359.5.
137. Id. § 359.5(a).
138. Id. § 359.5(a)(1) and (2).
139. Id. § 359.5(a)(2).
140. See Texas Banking Act of 1995, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-3.007 (Vernon
1995); TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.35-1 (Vernon 1985).
141. October 14, 1996 Press Release, Texas Department of Banking (on file with the
author).
142. See 12 C.F.R. § 325.103 which provides, among other matters, that a "well capital-
ized" bank is one which has a total risk-based capital ratio of 10.0 or greater; a Tier 1 risk-
based capital ratio of 6.0 or greater and a leverage ratio of 5.0 or greater. It is the leverage
ratio of 5.0 or greater which most closely equates to the prior Texas requirement of 6%
capital. The regulation goes on to provide that an adequately capitalized bank has, for
example, a leverage ratio of 4.0% or greater or a 3.0% leverage ratio if the bank has an
overall composite Camel rating of 1.
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bered 1001 through 1012, each issued July 31, 1996.143
2. Loan Limits
Additional recent changes by the Texas Department of Banking in-
clude the adoption of some new regulations. Those include the regula-
tion which expands upon certain exceptions to the statutory legal lending
limit.144 These new rules adopt attribution tests, similar to those under
the federal scheme, for purposes of determining when a third party guar-
antor shall have a loan attributed to him for purposes of determining the
bank's loan amount. 145 Previously no distinction was made between a
loan or guaranty for purposes of determining a bank customer's loan limit
exposure. Now where the customer is a guarantor, the loan will not count
against their legal lending limit unless they receive a direct benefit from
the loan or the expected source of repayment is from that guarantor.
146
3. Loan Fees
Under the previous Banking Code fees were expressly prohibited in
certain situations and no statutory authority existed for their charge
where they were not prohibited. The Loan Fees and Charges Regula-
tion 147 adopted this summer makes clear that fees may be charged or
reimbursement sought on any (i) first lien residential loan secured by real
estate, (ii) any loan the purpose of which is for other than personal, fam-
ily or household use and (iii) loans for personal family or household pur-
poses that are repayable in only one installment. 148
What is interesting about this regulation is that not only does it recog-
nize a bank's right to pass on to the borrower outside expenses incurred
(i.e., appraisals, survey, document preparation, title insurance, credit re-
ports, escrows and filing fees etc.) it provides that, so long as the fee is not
directly paid to a bank employee, fees may be paid directly to the bank
itself for services provided by bank employee. 149 So, for example the
bank can pass on to its borrower the "in house" cost or overhead associ-
ated with underwriting a loan, preparing documents to evidence the loan,
appraise the collateral and, presumably prepare the same for foreclosure
and/or foreclose upon the same. These fees must be reasonably related to
the costs incurred by the bank. This allows the bank to pass on to the
borrower costs that they are currently absorbing. Where a bank does not
know how much of its overhead is allocated to any particular function
143. See Interpretive Statements to Texas Banking Act with Related Provisions and
Laws as amended to the 1995 Regular Session available through the Texas Department of
Banking.
144. See Texas Banking Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-5.201 (Vernon Supp.
1997) for the statutory loan limits and 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 12.1 (West 1996) for the
regulations relating thereto.
145. Id. § 12.9.
146. Id. § 12.9(b).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. § 12.32.
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that they desire to charge for, the regulation allows them to rely upon a
cost analysis prepared by the Federal Reserve Board.150
Finally, the regulation provides that fees charged in accordance with
the regulation are not interest. While it has long been the law that fees
charged for identifiable services are not interest, where those services are
performed by the bank and have been traditionally absorbed as a part of
their overhead, a court's view of the result of this regulation will be
interesting.
150. Id. § 12.32(c)(1).
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